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Conscription typically drafts young men when they are at the height of their learning ability. It 
can depress the demand for higher education since skill atrophy and delayed entry into the 
civilian labor market reduce the returns to human-capital investments. To estimate the causal 
effect of conscription on the probability to obtain a university degree, we use a regression-
discontinuity design associated with the introduction of conscription in Germany. There is some 





Conscription into the armed forces is still actively enforced in many countries. 
Typically, men are called around the time they are 18 years old for a medical 
examination, after which they can either be declared fit to serve in the armed forces or 
exempted (temporarily or permanently). The selected individuals serve in the armed 
forces for a specified period of time. Military service can therefore be construed as a 
disruption of the human-capital-acquisition process of young men. 
 In Germany, national service was compulsory until June 30, 2011 for men 
either in the form of military service (Grundwehrdienst) or civilian service 
(Zivildienst) for conscientious objectors. When Germany was allowed to rearm itself 
after becoming a member of NATO in 1955, men born on or after July 1, 1937 had to 
undergo mental and physical examinations upon coming of age to determine whether 
they were fit to serve in the German armed forces (Bundeswehr). 
 However, those born earlier were exempted from CMS. Colloquially, they are 
called the “White Cohort” (weißer Jahrgang) because they neither served in World 
War II nor in the new German armed forces. We use the White Cohort as a control 
group to which we can compare the educational outcomes of those facing a positive 
probability of being drafted. 
2 DATA CONSTRUCTION AND DESCRIPTION 
We use two datasets for our empirical analysis. The first dataset (“Pension Data”) 
contains information on the service status of men and their dates of birth, which 
allows us to compute the probability of serving in the armed forces as a function of 
one’s date of birth. The second data source (“IABS”) consists is provided by the 
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Institute for Employment Research (IAB).1 Except for some special groups, the 
dataset contains the total German population that was gainfully employed for at least 
one day for the period 1975‒1995. 
 The following observations were removed from both datasets: females, East 
Germans (defined as having at least one employment spell in East Germany), persons 
who had an employment spell outside West Germany at any point (including 
foreigners and ethnic German immigrants), persons born before January 1, 1934, 
persons born after December 31, 1940, and professional soldiers. We excluded those 
people without a tertiary-system-entry certificate (Hochschulreife). Since these people 
were virtually excluded from entering university, their decision to seek out tertiary 
education is most likely unaffected by the introduction of conscription. For the 
Pension Data, these sample restrictions leave us with 15,835 men born around the 
threshold date who, if they performed CMS, served for not more than 12 months. For 
the IABS, we end up with 320,620 men. 
 Figure 1 plots the share of conscripted men by month of birth. Figure 2 shows 
the percentage of men who obtained a university degree over the sample cohorts. In 
general, one can observe that the completion rates for tertiary education are increasing 
over time, which generally corresponds to the easing of the access to higher education 
over the same period. About a year after the threshold date, the share of men with a 
university degree is much higher than the corresponding year before the threshold 
date. The overall mean for each side of the cutoff point clearly indicates that the non-
White Cohorts generally have a higher educational attainment than the White Cohorts. 
                                                             
1 See Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000) for details. A new version of the IABS is available for 
researchers via the Research Data Center of the German Employment Agency in the Institute for 





3 ESTIMATION STRATEGY AND RESULTS 
The White Cohort was exempted from conscription. Let iN  be equal to 1 if individual 
i  does not belong to the White Cohort and 0 if he does. The treatment status is 
represented by iM , which is equal to 1 if individual i  was eventually called to serve 
in the military and 0 otherwise. Let B  represent the threshold value at which point the 
conditional probability of receiving treatment jumps. The White Cohort is exempted 
from conscription so that 0]|[E =< BBM ii ; for those born on or after B , the 
probability to be drafted is a function of a vector of individual characteristics ix , i.e., 
)(]|[E iii fBBM x=≥ . 
 We implement a two-sample two-stage least-squares (TS2SLS) approach 
(Angrist and Krueger 1992; Inoue and Solon 2010). The reason is that we can observe 
iB  in both datasets but only iM  in the Pension Data and only iY , an indicator of 














where the second subscript indicates which dataset is used (1 = Pension Data; 2 = 
IABS). The variable 2ˆ iM  denotes the cross-sample fitted values, which are computed 
                                                             
2 In Bauer et al. (2012), individuals were matched from both datasets. However, for this paper, we 
obtained the whole sample of men from the IABS, not all of whom are available in our original dataset. 




by using the parameter estimates obtained from the first stage based on the Pension 
Data but using the observations in the IABS. We apply the restriction )()( 21 ii BgBf =  
so that the system can be estimated via two-sample two-stage least-squares. 
 Table 1 presents the first-stage results using the Pension Data; Table 2 shows 
the results of a regression of a binary variable indicating completion of a university 
degree on the instrument based on the IABS. All regressions include the control 
function )( iBf  with varying degrees of the polynomial order. Table 1 shows that the 
probability of being drafted is positively related to one’s date of birth. For the cohort 
of men born in 1937, we recover an estimate of 11.72 percentage points. 
[TABLE 1] 
 Table 2 presents the reduced-form estimates based on the IABS. Here, we 
highlight the fact that, without instrumenting conscription, we obtain a statistically 
significant relationship for two subsamples (Cohorts 1935‒1939 and 1937) between 
one’s date of birth, again as captured by the binary instrumental variable for being 
part of the White Cohort or not, and the probability of having a university degree. 
[TABLE 2] 
 Table 3 shows results using the TS2SLS. Our estimates indicate that 
conscription had a positive impact on the probability of obtaining a university degree. 
Although the statistical significance of our estimates depend on which cohorts we use, 
the estimate is significant for precisely that subsample for which the validity of the 
RD estimate is most credible. We calculate that conscription raised the probability of 
having a university degree by about 15 percentage points. That being said, the fact 
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that both the statistical significance and the magnitude of the effect change over the 
subsamples does not make the resulting estimates more compelling. 
[TABLE 3] 
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Similar to previous country-specific studies (Card and Lemieux 2001; Maurin and 
Xenogiani 2007), we find uncover evidence indicating that the introduction of 
conscription increased the demand for post-secondary investments in human capital. 
We estimate the effect of this introduction to be 1.7 percentage points. We attribute 
this to the fact that enrollment in an educational institution is an effective method to 
avoid the draft. Note, however, that this is not the effect of military service but rather 
the reduced-form impact of being draft-eligible. 
 The estimates range from about 9 to 15 percentage points, with the higher 
bound exhibiting the highest level of statistical significance within our range of 
estimates. Since our estimate is much higher and less robust than the reported effects 
in other studies, we emphasize caution in generalizing this estimated effect to the rest 
of the population, especially considering the sample exclusion criteria that were used 
as well as the fact that the identification in the RD design rests on differences in a 
small neighborhood. 
 We posit two reasons to explain our findings. The first reason can be indirectly 
attributed to skill atrophy. Human capital—in particular, that part of one’s stock that is 
not used in the armed forces but is rewarded in the civilian sector—tends to depreciate 
while on active duty. Replacing lost human capital requires additional education on 
the part of the former conscript. 
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 Second, post-conscription human-capital acquisition allows men to catch up 
with the rest of their cohort in terms of earnings. It is well known that the experience–
earnings profiles are dissimilar by educational attainment. While, on average, earnings 
increase as a function of labor-market experience, the slope of this function is much 
higher for university graduates than for non-graduates. Furthermore, the age–earnings 
profile of a university graduate would exhibit a longer flat region before reflecting a 
positive slope, indicating the fact that the person has spent more years in the school 
system before entering the civilian labor market. This flat region would be even 
longer for conscripts, which could induce them to resort to university training after 
their service in the hopes of quickly matching the earnings of their non-conscripted 
peers. 
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First-stage estimates (Pension Data) 
 Cohort 
 All 1935‒1939 1936‒1938 1937 








Polynomial degree J 3 2 1 1 
F-statistic 317.81 84.49 57.13 41.71 
Adjusted R2 0.1526 0.0500 0.0404 0.0533 
Observations 15,835 11,099 6,668 2,171 
NOTES. The dependent variable is having served in the armed forces. The 
regressions include a constant term. Bracketed numbers are the standard errors. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 







Reduced-form estimates (IABS) 
 Cohort 
 All 1935‒1939 1936‒1938 1937 








Polynomial degree J 3 2 1 1 
F-statistic 100.83 45.74 13.27 2.46 
Adjusted R2 0.0028 0.0014 0.0050 0.0001 
Observations 320,620 225,233 132,121 43,197 
NOTES. The dependent variable is having a university degree. The regressions 
include a constant term. Bracketed numbers are the standard errors. * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 






Impact of CMS on university education 
 Cohort 
 All 1935‒1939 1936‒1938 1937 








Polynomial degree J 3 2 1 1 
NOTES. Bracketed numbers are Murphy–Topel (1985) standard errors. The 
regressions include a constant term. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 







Probability to be drafted for military service by month of birth 
 
NOTE. Dashed lines represent quadratic fits over White Cohort and non-White Cohort 
observations. 
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Share of men with a university degree by date of birth 
 
NOTE. Dashed lines represent quadratic fits over White Cohort and non-White Cohort 
observations. 
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